Biparental investment in birds is implemented through parents making adaptive compensatory adjustments according to the work rate of their collaborator. Predictions for such evolutionarily stable cooperation in parental nestling feeding, and the behavioural mechanisms involved, can also be applied to systems with helpers-at-the-nest. Using the cooperatively breeding Arabian babbler, Turdoides squamiceps, we experimentally increased the provisioning rate of one or two subordinate birds in each group by giving these individuals extra food. Compared with control days before and after, the experimental treatment caused 'fed' birds to increase and 'unfed' birds to decrease their nest visit rates significantly, with no significant changes in load size. Thus, both parents and helpers in this system showed individual compensatory adjustments in their nestling-feeding effort according to the work rates of collaborators. There were no significant increases in total group visits during experimental treatments; therefore this study did not provide evidence for the predicted incomplete compensatory response. These results for helping-at-the-nest are consistent with empirical studies on parental care, and further suggest a central role for nestling begging in any cooperative provisioning of young in the nest.
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The optimal level of parental investment depends critically upon the trade-off between fitness returns from current versus future reproduction (Williams 1966; Trivers 1972) . When two parents provide care, optimal levels of investment will also depend upon collaborator work rates. Theoretical models suggest that biparental care can be evolutionarily stable (i.e. defection is not of selective advantage) if both parents incompletely compensate for any change in the level of care provided by their partner (Chase 1980; Houston & Davies 1985; Winkler 1987; Kacelnik & Cuthill 1990) . Intuitively, incomplete compensation can be seen to result in reduced total care and a lowering of nestling fitness, and so should tend to punish defectors and partners for not doing their fair share of the work, thereby providing an incentive for them to remain and cooperate fully in the care of young in the nest. Empirical evidence for such incomplete compensation in birds has been provided by studies on biparental species, using handicapping techniques to reduce the effort of one parent experimentally (e.g. Wright & Cuthill 1989; Markman et al. 1995) , as well as studies in which one parent was totally removed (e.g. Wolf et al. 1988; Bart & Tornes 1989; Dunn & Hannon 1989; Meek & Robertson 1994; Markman et al. 1996) .
These arguments concerning biparental cooperation can also be applied to systems of multiparental care, simply resulting in a game in which the optimum level of care by any one parent depends upon the combined effort of all other collaborators in the group (e.g. dunnocks, Prunella modularis: Houston & Davies 1985) . We might also expect the same to be true for groups of nonparents, such as helpers-at-the-nest in cooperatively breeding species of birds (Brown 1987; Emlen 1991) . However, this may be the case only if such helping represents investment in the young in the nest, such as kin selection for indirect fitness benefits or mutualistic advantages from group augmentation, because the predictions are less clear if helping acts as a signal or payment pertaining to group membership and/or reproductive privileges (see Wright 1997 Wright , 1998b . Some evidence for kin-selected compensation reactions comes from the fact that the activity of additional helpers in cooperatively breeding species is often associated with decreased individual provisioning rates by each member of the group (Brown 1987; Du Plessis 1991; Emlen & Wrege 1991; Crick 1992; Komdeur 1994; Wright 1997 Wright , 1998a . Furthermore, temporary removal experiments in cooperative breeders demonstrate compensatory
